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INTRODUCTION

In 1979 the Second Restatement of Torts aligned private nuisance law'
squarely with the law of torts by altering the elements of liability to require 1)
intent, 2) negligent or reckless conduct, or 3) abnormally dangerous conditions
or activities.2 The Second Restatement argued that what distinguishes nuisance
from negligence is only the type of interest invaded (land rather than person)
rather than some difference in terms of the unwanted conduct. In a nutshell, the
Second Restatement's position was that where there is neither intent nor an
abnormally dangerous activity, nuisance is essentially land negligence. Having
determined that nuisance law is nothing special in the world of torts, the Second
Restatement then concluded that private nuisance law had failed to notice that
tort liability had moved away from strict liability. The Second Restatement then
concluded: "an actor is no longer liable for accidental interferences with the use
and enjoyment of land."'

This article focuses on private nuisance law, which is quite distinct from public nuisance
liability. Indeed, some courts maintain that the connection between public and private nuisance is
nothing more than an "accident of historical development," for they are "two separate fields."
Brown v. Cty. Comm'rs, 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). The separation is all the
more important when one's focus is on the implications of nuisance law for property rights, because
public nuisance does not necessarily have anything to do with property. See In re Starlink Com
Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 844 n.12 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that "unlike a private
nuisance, a public nuisance does not necessarily involve interference with use or enjoyment of
land"); see also Ugrin v. Town of Cheshire, 54 A.3d 532, 539 (Conn. 2012) ("[P]ublic and private
nuisance law have 'almost nothing in common."'); City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 776
N.E.2d 368, 379 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("Although private nuisance and public nuisance are both
generally described as nuisance actions, . . . 'the two have almost nothing to do with one another,
except that each causes inconvenience to someone, and it would have been fortunate if they had
been called from the beginning by different names."'); Martins v. Interstate Power Co., No. 1-517
/ 00-0791, 2002 Iowa App. LEXIS 586, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2002) ("Confusion exists in
statements of the legal basis of liability as applied to the law of nuisance because the term
'nuisance' is used indiscriminately to designate harmful results. American courts show a
deplorable tendency to call everything a nuisance and let it go at that."). See generally City of
Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 1999-02590, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352, at *60 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 2000) ("Thus, in its broadest statement, the concept of a public nuisance 'seems
unconnected to place or property."').
For the purposes of simplicity within the text, the author has chosen to hereafter refer simply to
nuisance when speaking of private nuisance. Unless explicitly otherwise specified, all such
references to nuisance are to private nuisance law rather than public nuisance law.
2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).
3

Id. § 822 cmt. B.
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Nearly 40 years later, textbooks and treatises tend to teach the Second
Restatement approach,' but few courts have adopted this switch in the intent
requirement for nuisance. Indeed, the Second Restatement's approach cannot be
described fairly as a restatement of the law in the majority of jurisdictions.
Rather, only a minority of jurisdictions have adopted the Second Restatement's
position.s Little to nothing has been said about this development,' although
nuisance law continues to be a subject of immense scholarly interest.7 in general,
while a great deal has been written about nuisance in terms of its theory' and

4
Powell's treatise on property law describes this approach to nuisance as though it is the
majority position. The treatise focuses on conduct, finding that "four varieties of defendant conduct

can result in a private nuisance." RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (Michael A.

Wolf ed., 2017).
5
See infra Section II.C.
6
As for scholars, many repeat the Second Restatement's position explicitly. See Kathy
Seward Northern, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to EnvironmentalRacism, 21 WM.
& MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 485, 546 (1997) (paraphrasing the Second Restatement rule).
Others do not rely explicitly on the Second Restatement, but do suggest that only intentional or
negligent conduct will produce nuisance liability. See Ronald G. Aronovsky, Federalism and
CERCLA: Rethinking the Role of FederalLaw in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 33 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1, 10 (2006) (noting that nuisance liability generally requires negligence or intent); Troy A.
Rule, Shadows on the Cathedral:SolarAccess Laws in a DifferentLight, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 851,
864 (2010) (emphasizing the intent requirement essentially to the exclusion of other options).
Alternatively, some scholars note, but only in passing, the fact that nuisance can spring from
liability beyond that of intentional, negligence, or abnormally dangerous activities.
7
See Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, State of Nature Theory, and Environmental
Protection, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 15 (2009) (discussing the modern uses of nuisance in
environmental law and the connections with property law); Joseph H. Guth, Law for the Ecological
Age, 9 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 431, 435 (2007-08) (finding that nuisance law "is the core environmental
tort" and "the common law's primary vehicle for addressing virtually all environmental issues,
including land uses as well as air, water, land and groundwater pollution"); Mark Latham et al.,
The Intersection of Tort and EnvironmentalLaw: Where the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80
FORDHAM L. REv. 737, 739 (2011) (endeavoring to "develop clear lines and a comprehensive,
neutral framework for analyzing how the tort system can and should respond to environmental
injuries"); Albert C. Lin, Community Levers for Benefit Sharing, 21 LEwIS & CLARK L. REv. 357
(2017) (discussing the potential for nuisance liability for fracking); David S. Wilgus, Comment,
The NatureofNuisance: JudicialEnvironmentalEthics andLandowner Stewardship in the Age of
Ecology, 33 MCGEORGE L. REv. 99, 103 (2001) (examining "how the doctrine of nuisance can be
a tool to protect environmental values while respecting the sanctity of private property rights").
8
See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, LiabilityRules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (establishing the trend
of using nuisance law to write about the division between property and tort law). Other scholars
have followed this trend. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, PropertyRights andLiabilityRules: The
Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REv. 601 (2001) (using pollution as the primary
example of harm to a neighboring property); Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use
Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1379 (2010)
(focusing on land-use torts, including nuisance);Christopher Essert, Nuisance and the Normative
Boundaries of Ownership, 52 TULSA L. REv. 85 (2016) (discussing the multiple theoretical
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importance to a variety of areas of modem law,' especially environmental law,' 0
relatively little has been written about the evolution of the doctrine of nuisance
law across the states."
On the other hand, a larger number of states by far maintain the
traditional position, which extends liability for nuisance beyond acts that are
intentional or negligent to interferences more generally, regardless of the conduct
of the defendant. As a result, this means that in a number of states, accidental
interferences remain actionable under nuisance law-logically because there is
no set mind-state required for nuisance. Yet, despite the resistance to the new
rule, the Restatement (Third) project does not plan to make any revisions to the
rule proposed in the Restatement (Second).12
The old approach to nuisance law is not dying away quietly.I In fact, in
the new millennium courts have often gone to some trouble to explain and

&

approaches to nuisance law and their implications for our understanding of the nature of real
property); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, PropertyRules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1996) (using industrial pollution and nuisance cases as
examples).
9
I have previously discussed how nuisance law has evolving implications for a wide spectrum
of cases. See Jill Fraley, The UncompensatedTakings of Nuisance Law, 62 VILL. L. REV. 651
(2017).
10
See, e.g., Stephen Harland Butler, Headwinds to a Clean Energy Future: Nuisance Suits
against Wind Energy Projects in the United States, 97 CAuF. L. REv. 1337 (2009) (renewable
energy); David A. Dana, The Mismatch Between Public Nuisance Law and Global Warming, 18
SUP. CT. EcoN. REV. 9 (2010) (global warming); Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of
Parlors:Using NuisanceLaw to Affect the Location ofPollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403 (1997) (siting
of polluters); Tracy D. Hester, A New Front Blowing In: State Law and the Future of Climate
Change Public Nuisance Litigation, 31 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 49 (2012) (climate change); Albert C.
Lin, Decipheringthe Chemical Soup: Using Public Nuisance to Compel Chemical Testing, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955 (2010) (toxins regulation); Matthew Edwin Miller, Note, The Right
Issue, the Wrong Branch:Arguments Against Adjudicating Climate ChangeNuisance Claims, 109
MICH. L. REv. 257 (2010) (climate change litigation); Endre Szalay, Comment, BreathingLife into
the Dead Zone: Can the FederalCommon Law of NuisanceBe Used to Control Nonpoint Source
Water Pollution?, 85 TuL. L. REv. 215 (2010) (water pollution); see also Joseph F. Falcone HI
Daniel Utain, Comment, You Can Tech an Old Dog New Tricks: The Application of Common Law
in Present-DayEnvironmentalDisputes, 11 VIL. ENvTL. L.J. 59 (2000) (discussing generally the
applicability of common law nuisance claims to modem environmental issues).
"
I have previously discussed this lack of literature on the doctrine of nuisance law as opposed
to its theoretical position. See supra note 9.
12
See Kenneth W. Simons, The Restatement (Third) of Torts and TraditionalStrict Liability:
Robust Rationales, SlenderDoctrines,44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1355, 1355 n.1 (2009) (explaining
that no changes are anticipated for the private nuisance rules). The Author here would add that a
member working on the next Property Restatement indicated that changes may be in the works in
that realm, but stated that if a draft were shared, it could not be cited. The Author declined to read
such drafts or to change her positions here based on any documents she was not free to cite.
13
Notably, this is not the only point on which the Second Restatement and courts have had an
ongoing debate. The Restatement defines nuisance as a "nontrespassory invasion" of one's
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emphasize their resistance to the Second Restatement's proposed rule-and for
good reason. Nuisance law reaches to the right to exclude. Courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, have long maintained that the "right to exclude
others" is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property."14 Thomas Merrill has taken this position
further, arguing that the right to exclude is the very defining thing of property
rights: "Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have property."s
This article defends the positions of those courts and argues that the
Second Restatement got it wrong. While the Second Restatement was correct
that there had been "confusion" in the case law, the confusion was not about the
conduct versus the interest invaded, but rather the muddling of the law of
negligence with the law of nuisance.
This article argues that nuisance was historically unique in tort law
because of its special role in protecting property rights.' In other words, nuisance
historically had distinct features addressed to the special situation of land. Most
importantly, nuisance protected the right to exclude in a way that no other cause
of action did. The Second Restatement's change then diminished our rights to
private property to the extent that it has been adopted. The majority of courts
retain the more logical and defensible position-that property rights are special
and nuisance encompasses something more than the idea of negligence.
First, Part II of this article will begin by providing the traditional
approach to nuisance law, as generally followed by the courts prior to the Second
Restatement. This Part will then introduce the Second Restatement's proposed
changes and evidence of the limited acceptance of that position by courts. Before
continuing to examine the Second Restatement's focus on negligence in Part IV,
property rights. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Some
jurisdictions have accepted this definition, but many do not use the term "nontrespassory." This is
unsurprising given how common it is for plaintiffs to simultaneously pursue actions for trespass
and nuisance. Indeed, scholars have considered the potential advantages of pursuing both causes
of action together. See Anthony Z. Roisman & Alexander Wolff, Trespass by Pollution:Remedy
by Mandatory Injunction, 21 FORDHAMENVTL. L. REv. 157, 158 (2010) (exploring the "alternative
remedy" that is nuisance "accompanied by trespass"). With that said, the Restatement (Second)
does acknowledge that there "may, however, be some overlapping of the causes of action for
trespass and private nuisance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 821D cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.
1979). From the perspective of a teacher, the "nontrespassory" language is unfortunate, because it
suggests to students that one must maintain either a trespass action or a nuisance action, and not
both. Whether or not this is what the textbook actually teaches, this appears to be what students
commonly conclude from the language.
14
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
is
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998).
16
Notably, historically courts have often changed the scope of property rights through
redefining the scope of nuisance law. See Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience ofProperty, 55 AaRz. L.
REv. 847, 896 (2013) (arguing that nuisance law, and thus the boundaries of property rights,
changed with the development from more rural to more urban communities); Joseph H. Guth, Law
for the EcologicalAge, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 431, 435 (2008) (finding that nuisance law "established
general principles of property law that remain widely applicable today").
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Part III considers whether or not nuisance law had already moved to accepting a
more tort-oriented perspective through employing the tort concept of
foreseeability. Part III focuses on the Second Restatement's adoption of the
negligence approach and the significant resistance of courts to this position. Part
IV considers the responses of others scholars to the distinction between property
and tort approaches and the importance of a shift between the two. Part V argues
that the Second Restatement should not have adopted the tort orientation to
nuisance and that courts have been correct in refusing the Second Restatement's
position. This Part argues that adopting the Second Restatement's position would
significantly weaken property rights.
II. THE SECOND RESTATEMENT POSITION: INTENT, NEGLIGENCE
OR ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES

This Part provides the relevant history necessary to understanding the
important choice between aligning nuisance with negligence. This Part begins
by reviewing the traditional standard of nuisance law. This Part then continues,
introducing the Second Restatement's proposed change to a more tort-based
approach to nuisance that aligns with negligence law. Finally, this Part considers
the limited number of court decisions that have supported the restatement
position. All of this Part serves as a background for considering more generally
the problem of adopting a negligence approach to nuisance and sets the stage for
the author's argument that a negligence approach significantly weakens property
rights and should rightly be rejected by courts.
A.

The HistoricalPositionthat the Second Restatement Sought to Change

Historically, nuisance is defined as an interference with the use and
enjoyment of land. More broadly,
[a] "nuisance" includes anything that annoys or disturbs the free
use of one's property, or which renders its ordinary use or
physical occupation uncomfortable, and this extends to
everything that endangers life or health, gives offense to the
senses, violates the laws of decency, or obstructs the reasonable
and comfortable use of property."

17

58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 1 (Supp. 2018).
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The idea of nuisance law is to provide property rights protections. " In pursuance
of this goal, courts tend to "broadly construe an occupant's right to the use and
enjoyment of land.""
Nuisance law is also a limitation on property rights. Nuisance law places
limits on the land uses that a neighbor can choose without becoming liable for
nuisance. Thus, "nuisance rules ... diminish a landowner's use privileges." 20
Such limits represent the fullness of the neighbor's property rights and prevent
interference with those rights. "This is the province of nuisance law: Property
owners must not use their property unreasonably in ways that substantially
interfere with their neighbors' use and enjoyment of their property."21
Historically, nuisance law did not require a tort-like finding of fault. 22
Initially, courts applied the doctrine as a relatively strict liability style enterprise,
imposing "absolute liability for interference with the enjoyment of property."
Instead, nuisance law began as more of a strict liability enterprise.2 4 Under this
rule, "[a] judgment for damages in this class of cases is a matter of absolute right,
where injury is shown." 25 Traditionally, as the Second Restatement
acknowledged, private nuisance liability existed "irrespective of the type of
conduct involved." 26

Daniel C. Esty, Toward OptimalEnvironmentalGovernance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1495, 1552
(1999) (noting that nuisance law functions to provide "property rights protections").
'9
58 AM. JuR. 2D Nuisances § 1 (Supp. 2018).
20
Robert C. Ellickson, Propertyin Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1363 (1993).
21
Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611, 642
(1988). Such limitations, while longstanding, also create a bit of an "eternal thicket" because the
limitations imposed by nuisance law tend to clash with the "intuitive image of absoluteness" that
we have of private property. Joan Williams, The Rhetoric ofProperty, 83 IOWA L. REv. 277, 360
(1998).
22
This paragraph describes the more general trend of nuisance, which became less and less
consistent through time. My previous work describes some of the varied evolutions of nuisance
law in the course of arguing for the implications of some of those trends for property law. See
Fraley, supra note 9. Robert Bone has considered the divergence of nuisance law in the last half of
the nineteenth century, an era that he describes as "a period in which jurists prized determinate and
uniform systems of law." Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American
Nuisance Law: 1850-1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1101, 1105 (1986).
23
Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-EntrepeneurialNuisance Injunctions-Avoiding
the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 621, 622 (1976).
24
Jeff L. Lewin, CompensatedInjunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA L.
REv. 775, 779 n.24 (1986).
25
Louisville & N. Terminal Co. v. Lellyett, 85 S.W. 881, 888 (Tenn. 1904).
26
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 822 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
18
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The Second Restatement Change: PairingUnreasonablenesswith
Negligence

In 1979, the Second Restatement of Torts changed the traditional
approach to the law of nuisance. The new "general rule" provided:
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if,
his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest
in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is
either
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules
controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for
abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.27
The new rule made important changes to the traditional rule for nuisance
law.28 The Second Restatement paired unreasonableness with intentionality,
removing the possibility of proving a nuisance through simply substantial and
unreasonableness of the interference without any reference to the mental state of
the defendant.2 9 The remainder of the rule then required that the defendant's
conduct be taken into account. The interference had to either be through
negligent or reckless conduct or, alternatively, be a product of abnormally
dangerous activities. This meant, the Second Restatement concluded, "[1]iability
for an invasion of interests in the use and enjoyment of land now depends upon
the presence of some type of tortious conduct." 0 No longer would nuisance be
measured simply by the idea of whether or not there was an unreasonable
interference.
The Second Restatement justified this change from the previous volumes
by arguing that the treatise was fixing a confusion in the existing law. The Second
Restatement explained, "[flailure to recognize that private nuisance has reference

27

Id. § 822.

28
For further discussion of the multiple changes introduced by this section of the Second
Restatement, see Hon. Robert E. Keeton, RestatingStrict Liability andNuisance, 48 VAND. L. REV.
595 (1995).
29
As explained in the Second Restatement:

An invasion of a person's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by
any type of liability-forming conduct is private nuisance. The invasion that
subjects a person to liability may be either intentional or unintentional. A
person is subject to liability for an intentional invasion when his conduct is
unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case, and he is subject
to liability for an unintentional invasion when his conduct is negligent, reckless
or abnormally dangerous. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST.
30

1979),

Id
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to the interest invaded and not to the type of conduct that subjects the actor to
liability has led to confusion."' In other words, the Second Restatement authors
believed that the differentiating factor for nuisance law was the context of landrather than any different requirement of conduct from the unusual requirements
of tort law generally. The authors continued, "[t]hus, in respect to an interference
with the use and enjoyment of land, attempts are made to distinguish between
private nuisance and negligence, overlooking the fact that private nuisance has
reference to the interest invaded and negligence to the conduct that subjects the
actor to liability for the invasion."32
At the time, a few courts followed the practice that the Restatement was
describing-but only a few. The Second Restatement took the position that
relying on negligence was the better and more logical approach to nuisance law.
The authors justified this position by arguing that nuisance law was traditionally
a matter of strict liability and that it should change to accommodate the general
trend of tort liability. The authors explained:
[t]his confusion is mainly due to a failure to notice in respect to
private nuisance the change that has occurred in the basis of tort
liability. In early tort law the rule of strict liability prevailed. An
actor was liable for the harm caused by his acts whether that
harm was done intentionally, negligently or accidentally. In
course of time the law came to take into consideration not only
the harm inflicted but also the type of conduct that caused it, in
determining liability.33
The Second Restatement maintained that
[t]his change came later in the law of private nuisance than in
other fields. Private nuisance was remediable by an action on the
case irrespective of the type of conduct involved. Thus the form
of action did not call attention to the change from strict liability
to liability based on conduct.34
The authors went on to argue, "the change has occurred, and an actor is no longer
liable for accidental interferences with the use and enjoyment of land but only
for such interferences as are intentional and unreasonable or result from
3
negligent, reckless or abnormally dangerous conduct."s
As will be discussed in further detail below, these assertions about the
state of the law and the transformation of law were not quite accurate. As
explained below, the law had changed in only a couple of jurisdictions as of the
31
32

Id. § 822 cmt. b.
Id.

33
34
35

Id.
Id.
Id.
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time of publication, and 40 years later, it remains the minority rule and one that
is highly opposed by the majority of jurisdictions.
C. Courts Adopting the Second Restatement's Position
Some courts follow the Second Restatement's position explicitly."
These jurisdictions adopted definitions of nuisance that match the Restatement's
three categories of intent. For example, in South Dakota
Ohio, for instance, has adopted the Second Restatement's language requiring intent or
negligence. Hurier v. Gumm, No. CA99-01-005, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5122, at *11 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 1, 1999). New Jersey, similarly, follows the Second Restatement's position. Birchwood
Lakes Colony Club v. Medford Lakes, 449 A.2d 472, 477 (N.J. 1982). Mirroring this approach,
Texas finds that "a defendant can be liable for causing a nuisance if the defendant intentionally
causes it, negligently causes it, or-in limited circumstances-causes it by engaging in abnormally
dangerous or ultra-hazardous activities." Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d
580, 588 (Tex. 2016). New York adopts the Second Restatement's approach, making
unreasonableness work only in the context of intentional acts. Nalley v. Gen. Elec. Co., 630
N.Y.S.2d 452, 455 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); Anderson v. Elliott, 24 A.D.3d 400, 400 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005). Pennsylvania also links intent with unreasonableness. Karpiak v. Russo, 676 A.2d 270, 272
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). Mississippi follows the same approach. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v.
Ferguson, 662 So. 2d 648, 662 (Miss. 1995). Wisconsin also requires a tortious act to create
liability. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee, 691 N.W.2d 658, 669 ("If the
conduct of the defendant is not of a kind that subjects him to liability the nuisance exists, but he is
not liable for it.") (alterations omitted).
A few courts specifically take adopting the Second Restatement's position to require the merger of
negligence and nuisance. See Little Hocking Water Ass'n v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 91 F.
Supp. 3d 940, 973 (S.D. Ohio 2015) ("[Courts] have held that at the summary judgment stage,
nuisance and negligence 'merge, as the nuisance claims rely upon a finding of negligence."'); N.N.
Int'l (USA) Corp. v. Gladden Props., L.L.C., No. 103909/09,2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2546, at *20
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 31, 2016) (noting that "nuisance, either public or private, based on negligence
and whether characterized as either negligence or nuisance, is but a single wrong") (citations
omitted); State v. Fermenta ASC Corp., 238 A.D.2d 400, 403-04 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) ("In the
absence of negligence or intent, a cause of action to recover damages arising from a private
nuisance cannot be maintained."). A few jurisdictions had reached this position before the Second
Restatement. See Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 972 (N.Y. 1977) ("A
nuisance, either public or private, based on negligence and whether characterized as either
negligence or nuisance, is but a single wrong, and 'whenever a nuisance has its origin in
negligence,' negligence must be proven, and a plaintiff 'may not avert the consequences of his or
her own contributory negligence by affixing to the negligence of the wrongdoer the label of a
nuisance."') (ccitations omitted); Culwell v. Abbott Constr. Co., 506 P.2d 1191, 1196 (Kan. 1973)
("[A] nuisance may result from conduct which is intentional or negligent or conduct which falls
within the principle of strict liability without fault. The point is that nuisance is a result and
negligence is a cause and they cannot be distinguished otherwise.").
Other courts refuse to equate nuisance and negligence, even while adopting the Second
Restatement's general approach to liability. See Physicians Plus Ins. v. Midwest Mut. Ins., 646
N.W.2d 777, 792 n.22 (Wis. 2002) (adopting a standard of negligent, intentional or abnormally
dangerous, but also maintain that "negligence and nuisance are distinct torts, and that negligence
is just one way (as opposed to intentional) that a nuisance can be maintained").
36
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one is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his
conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in
the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either:
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and
otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for
negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous
conditions or activities."
In these courts, provided that there is no intent or abnormally dangerous activity,
where the court finds that there is no negligence, then the nuisance claim is
automatically "resolved" by the determination of the negligence action.3 8
Other courts have arrived at the Second Restatement's position through
a more roundabout method. In Connecticut, for example, foreseeability is not
directly a part of establishing the elements of an action for nuisance. Instead, the
court specifically requires that the "condition have a natural tendency to create
danger and inflict injury upon person or property" and this is, thereafter, linked
with it being "reasonably foreseeable that the kind of injury complained of could
result from the condition alleged to be a nuisance."39 Additionally, other courts
have resisted adopting the Second Restatement's approach to the absolute
exclusion of other approaches. For example, Kansas follows the Second
Restatement's approach, but also acknowledges that there may be "very rare
exceptions" to the Second Restatement's three-prong path to liability.40
Louisiana, which explicitly rejects the common law of nuisance, 41 does not adopt

n
Atkinson v. City of Pierre, 706 N.W.2d 791, 796 (S.D. 2005). Notably, however, it is not
clear that South Dakota does not permit a finding of nuisance in a larger spectrum of cases. This is
because in South Dakota, it is possible to bring a cause of action for nuisance under either a
common law approach or under the statutory scheme for nuisance. Id. at 795. The statutory
definition reads quite differently from the common law rules quoted above. The statutory definition
includes an act that "[i]n any way renders other persons insecure in life, or in the use of property."
S.D. CODIED LAWS § 21-10-1 (2017). Case law suggests that the statutory approach to nuisance
in South Dakota is more similar to the traditional focus on reasonableness. See Prairie Hills Water
& Dev. Co. v. Gross, 653 N.W.2d 745, 752 (S.D. 2002) ("'[T]he existence of a nuisance is subject
to a rule of reason. It involves the maintenance of a balance between the right to use property and
the right to enjoy property unaffected by others' uses.' The ultimate question in each cause is
whether the challenged use is reasonable in view of all of the surrounding circumstances.")
(citation omitted). In contrast, when applying the common law approach to nuisance, South Dakota
courts tend to think more in terms of negligence, or at least conduct of the actor, requiring
landowners to exercise a duty of "ordinary care." Collins v. Barker, 668 N.W.2d 548, 553 (S.D.
2003).
38
Follett v. Mulberry Mobilehome Park Assocs., No. B244102, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 1910, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2014).
3
Cty. of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 870 F. Supp. 496, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
40
Sandifer Motors, Inc. v. City of Roeland Park, 628 P.2d 239, 246 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
41
Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475 So. 2d 1071, 1077 (La. 1985) ("[T]he common law of nuisance
has no binding, precedential value in the courts of this state.").
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the Second Restatement's approach specifically, but by statute, does focus on
"the exercise of reasonable care," applying a "should have known" standard.4 2
It's important to clarify the somewhat ambiguous term "intentional" in
the context of a nuisance action. Some jurisdictions that adopt the Second
Restatement's language, appear to interpret intent simply by contrasting it with
negligence.4 3 In 1996, the Supreme Court of South Dakota addressed this
ambiguity in the case law. The court first explained that "'[i]ntent' in its most
commonly used sense, means (1) a state of mind; (2) about consequences of a
given act, not about the act itself; and (3) having in mind a desire to cause certain
consequences knowing these consequences are substantially certain to result.""
The court then went on to explain how this worked in the nuisance context:
"Furthermore, an intentional intrusion in the nuisance context is an invasion that
the actor knowingly causes, [such as] natural stray voltage, in the pursuit of a
laudable enterprise, [such as] provision of electrical power, without any desire to
cause harm"45
At this point, the court's meaning is not entirely clear, but the court goes
on to explain very clearly that, "[i]t is not enough to make an invasion intentional
that the actor realizes or should realize that this conduct involves a serious risk
or likelihood of causing the invasion."46 The court seeks a higher standard: "The
actor must either act for the purpose of causing it or know that it is resulting or
is substantially certain to result."4 7 Applying this to the case before the court in
that instance, the court explained that
[t]he knowledge element on which the definition of "intentional
invasion" turns exists not when the electric power company
knows it is providing electricity with a natural by-product being
stray voltage and ground current, but when the company knows
these phenomena are occurring at unreasonable levels, causing
harm and continues to act to cause the harm.48

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 667 (2017).
Thus, a court can find that
it has been said that in many, if not in most, instances the existence of a
nuisance presupposes negligence. Unless a nuisance is based on action that is
intentional and unreasonable, if an act or condition can become a nuisance only
by reason of the negligent manner in which it is performed or permitted, a right
of recovery cannot be shown independently of the existence of negligence.
Sandifer Motors, Inc., 628 P.2d at 245.
4
Kuper v. Lincoln-Union Elec. Co., 557 N.W.2d 748, 762 (S.D. 1996).
42

43

45

Id.

46

Id.
Id (alterations omitted).
Id

47
48
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The court focuses not on the risk or likelihood, but on the creation of actual harm.
More commonly, however, jurisdictions adopt the Second Restatement
language but do not focus on the intent to harm. Instead, these jurisdictions focus
on simple knowledge. This is the approach that the Second Restatement itself
follows.49 "Occasionally, a nuisance proceeds from a malicious desire to do
harm, but usually a nuisance is intentional in the sense that the defendant has
created or continued the condition causing the nuisance with full knowledge that
the harm to the plaintiffs' interest is substantially bound to follow therefrom.""o
Similarly, in Georgia, the Court of Appeals explained that
[o]ccasionally, the defendant may act from a malicious desire to
so harm for its own sake, but more often the situation involving
a private nuisance is one where the invasion is intentional
merely in the sense that the defendant has created or continued
the interference with full knowledge that the harm to the
plaintiff's interests are occurring or are substantially certain to
follow. 5 1

In this approach, the nuisance is intentional if either "the actor (a) acts for the
purpose of causing it, or (b) knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain
to result from his conduct." 52 A number of jurisdictions follow this approach,
requiring either the purpose to harm or knowledge."

§ 825 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 320 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
51
Fielder v. Rice Constr. Co., 522 S.E.2d 13, 16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
52
Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Elec. Coop., 548 N.W.2d 829, 835 (Wis. 1996).
s3
See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 391 (Colo. 2001) (adopting essentially
identical language to Vogel); Keeney v. Town of Old Saybrook, No. CV 91 0396716S, 1996 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 2748, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1996) (same); United Proteins, Inc. v.
Farmland Indus., Inc., 915 P.2d 80, 85 (Kan. 1996) (same); Keiswetter v. Petoskey, 335 N.W.2d
94, 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (same); Morgan v. Quailbrook Condo. Co., 704 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah
1985) (same). But see Traver Lakes Cmty. Maint. Ass'n v. Douglas Co., 568 N.W.2d 847, 852
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997) ("Unlike a claim of negligence, the defendant's intent in causing a trespass
or a nuisance is generally irrelevant.").
Additionally, some jurisdictions that do not follow the Restatement's approach, but also designate
some nuisances as intentional, use similar language restricting intent to either purpose or
knowledge. See Accashian v. City of Danbury, No. XO1CV 970147228S, 1999 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 36, at *25 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1999) (finding that the invasion is intentional where
the actor acted "for the purpose of causing it or know that it is resulting or is substantially certain
to result").
49
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III. ANOTHER METHOD OF INCORPORATING NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINES INTO
NUISANCE: DOES NUISANCE DOCTRINE INCORPORATE THE KEY TORT
CONCEPT OF FORESEEABILITY?

Before turning to the topic of the resistance maintained by the majority
of jurisdictions to the Second Restatement's position, it is appropriate to pause
to consider another way that nuisance law can be shifted in the direction of tort
concepts-particularly as a result of influence of negligence concepts on the law
of nuisance. Specifically, it is worth considering how courts have included the
concept of foreseeability, a traditional negligence concept, in the law of nuisance.
The simple question is whether nuisance doctrine incorporates the key tort
concept of foreseeability.
The complexity of American nuisance law should prevent a simple
answer to this question, even in any one jurisdiction. Nuisance liability emerges
from three to four separate bases and courts approach foreseeability differently
in each of these circumstances. Therefore, theoretically, it would be necessary to
ask the question much more specifically to be assured of an accurate answer. In
jurisdictions that follow the Second Restatement's position, liability emerges
from intent, negligence, or strict liability. Where damages result from
negligence, there is a split in jurisdictions regarding whether or not foreseeability
limits damages. 5 4 In jurisdictions that do not adopt the Second Restatement's
limitation of nuisance to intent, negligence, and strict liability, there is an
additional basis for liability: unreasonable interferences, whatever the mental
state of the defendant. While logically the multiple methods of establishing
nuisance liability should lead to different takes on how the doctrine of
foreseeability works in the context of nuisance law, the trend has been more
toward overarching statements that either allow foreseeability considerations or
refuse them.
Some courts have made broad general statements against including any
ideas of foreseeability in an analysis of nuisance." For example, some courts
54
See Peter B. Kutner, The End of Rylands v. Fletcher? Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern
Counties Leather Plc, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 73, 74 (1995).
5s
Many such general statements relate to the relationship between public nuisance law and
foreseeability. While this article focuses specifically on private nuisance and therefore does not
address this in any depth, it is worth pausing to note that courts adopt multiple viewpoints on the
relationship.

Where the cause of action for public nuisance lies against a public entity or local government, some
jurisdictions use foreseeability to limit the duty of care. Housing Auth. v. Superior Court, no.
A032085, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1993). Some jurisdictions, while not
explicitly using the concept of foreseeability, do employ the language of "knows or has reason to
know" in defining public nuisance liability. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig.,
175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The Second Restatement of Torts adopted this position,
noting that circumstances indicating an unreasonable, interference include whether "the actor
knows or has reason to know" that her conduct "has a significant effect upon the public right."
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state specifically that foreseeability is not a concern in private nuisance cases:
"In determining whether a defendant's conduct is 'unreasonable' in a nuisance
case, the test is not unreasonable risk or foreseeability as these terms are used in
negligence cases."" Other courts have extended this doctrine to the context of
public nuisances as well, refusing to require foreseeability for public nuisances.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that "[t]he absence of facts supporting
concepts of negligence, foreseeability or unlawful conduct is not in the least fatal
to a finding of the existence of a common law public nuisance.""
On the other hand, in some jurisdictions courts have made broad
declarations that accept the concept of foreseeability. The Supreme Court of
Indiana, for example, has said that the very "essence of a nuisance claim is the
foreseeable harm unreasonably created by the defendants' conduct."" More
commonly, however, when a court openly endorses foreseeability, the context is
for public nuisance claims rather than private nuisance claims.
Additionally, a jurisdiction may require that a nuisance be proved
through proximate cause. 0 For example, Connecticut defines a nuisance as: "(1)
the condition complained of had a natural tendency to create danger and inflict
injury upon person or property; (2) the danger created was a continuing one; (3)
the use of the land was unreasonable or unlawful; [and] (4) the existence of the

&

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). On the other hand, in some
jurisdictions "[q]uestions of pinpointed duty, foreseeability, remoteness, intent, or the
'wrongfulness' of defendant's conduct are not at issue in public nuisance abatement actions
brought by the State." People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 309 A.D.2d 91, 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
(emphasis in original).
56
Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 637 (N.D. 1992) (citation omitted).
5
Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871, 883 (Pa. 1974). The Texas Court
of Appeals has, similarly, found that "[w]hile foreseeability is required before a duty will be found
in the negligence context, it is not a requirement of a nuisance claim." Dodson v. Javelina Co., No.
13-95-481-CV, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 1708, at *5 (Tex. App. Apr. 3, 1997).
s8
City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222,1235 (Ind. 2003); KB Home Ind.,
Inc. v. Rockville TBD Corp., 928 N.E.2d 297, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
5
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1127 (111. 2004) ((citing
Lee v. Chicago Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493, 503 (Ill. 1992)) ("The proper inquiry regarding
legal cause involves an assessment of foreseeability, in which we ask whether the injury is of a
type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his conduct.")); McGhee v. Norfolk
S. Ry., 60 S.E. 912, 913 (N.C. 1908) (finding that when the plaintiff sues for special damages by
reason of a public nuisance, he must show as an essential element in his cause of action that such
nuisance was the proximate cause of his injury); State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 451
(R.I. 2008) (quoting and agreeing with City of Chicago on this point).
0
For a discussion of how proximate cause can serve as a defense to nuisance, see Justin Pidot,
Note, The Applicability of Nuisance Law to Invasive Plants: Can Common Law Liability Inspire

Government Action?, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 183, 203-06 (2005). As one might expect, the idea of
foreseeability is particularly important in the context of environmental law, where often injuries
result from actions that were taken long ago or with less knowledge than we currently possess
about a toxic substance.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5

434

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

121
[
[Vol.

nuisance was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries and damages."6 1
such circumstances, foreseeability of the damages becomes a requirement to
recover due to the general definition of a proximate cause.62 "Proximate cause is
a more exacting standard than simple 'but for' causation.""
While general causation has long been a part of the nuisance analysis,
requiring proximate cause is a minority position. Many jurisdictions refuse to
require proximate causation.6r The difference is substantial, because proximate
causation imposes that more exacting standard on the plaintiffs, increasing the
proof necessary to establish a claim for nuisance. Such a change makes a not

Bentley v. City of New Haven, No. CV970403487S, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2505, at *7
(Conn. Super. Ct. Sept 4, 2001). In Connecticut, foreseeability can also be relevant in determining
reasonableness. See Peterson v. Oxford, 459 A.2d 100, 103 (Conn. 1983).
The issue of reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined on a case by
case basis, considering all the relevant circumstances, including such factors
as the amount of harm caused, its foreseeability, the purpose or motive with
which the act was done, and the consideration of whether the utility of the use
of the land outweighed the gravity of the harm resulting.
Id.
A few other jurisdictions, similarly, include proximate cause as a basic element of a private
nuisance claim. George v. Hercules Real Estate Servs., Inc., 795 S.E.2d 81, 87 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)
("Proximate cause is also an essential element in a nuisance claim."); Hall v. Phillips, 436 N.W.2d
139, 145 (Neb. 1989) ("One may be subject to liability for a tortious private nuisance (1) if the
defendant's conduct is a proximate cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land and (2) if the invasion is intentional and unreasonable or is otherwise actionable
under rules controlling liability for negligence or liability for abnormally dangerous conditions or
activities."); Home Sales, Inc. v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 382 S.E.2d 463, 469 (S.C. Ct. App.
1989) (requiring proximate causation for the injury); DeYoung v. Cenex Ltd., 1 P.3d 587, 590
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing that proximate cause is an element of a nuisance claim).
62
For example, Texas applies this definition: "[A]n act or omission is a proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries or damages if it appears from the evidence that the injury or damage was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act or omission." Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F.
Supp. 2d 956, 967 (E.D. Tex. 1997). But see Lever Bros. Co. v. Langdoc, 655 N.E.2d 577, 584
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995) ("The fundamental element of proximate cause is that the injury or
consequence of the wrongful act be of a class reasonably foreseeable at the time of the act.");
Dodson, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 1708, at *5 (stating that foreseeability is not required for a
nuisance claim).
63
Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 451.
6
Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245, 264
(D.N.J. 2000) (finding that public nuisance "does not require a showing of proximate cause").
Recently, the Federal District Court for the District of New York considered the history of nuisance
and proximate causation in state court decisions. The court found that "[t]he label 'proximate
cause' is occasionally employed in public nuisance actions," but that such "cases often involve
more than one cause of action or are otherwise ambiguous." NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F.
Supp. 2d 435,496 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) As a result, the court concluded that, "[t]he rule employed with
respect to limitations on liability, whatever label is used, in public nuisance actions must be less
restrictive than in individual tort actions." Id.
61
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insignificant movement in the jurisprudence towards limiting nuisance law as a
remedy for property damage by neighbors.
IV. EXPLICIT RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND RESTATEMENT'S POSITION AND
THE MOVEMENT OF NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINES INTO NUISANCE

A number of jurisdictions continue to resist the Second Restatement's
alignment of nuisance with negligence. American Jurisprudence summarizes the
position of these jurisdictions: "The terms 'negligence' and 'nuisance' are not
synonymous. They describe completely distinct concepts, which constitute
distinct torts, different in their nature and in their consequences."" Therefore,
"[a] claim of nuisance is more than a claim of negligence, and negligent acts do
not, in themselves, constitute a nuisance; rather, negligence is merely one type
of conduct upon which liability for nuisance may be based, and thus, negligence
is not a necessary ingredient of a nuisance.""
Jurisdictions that resist the negligence approach to nuisance tend to
reason that nuisance is about the nature of the land." Indeed, such courts often
note that, "the crux of a nuisance case is unreasonable land use."" In other words,
the only potential duty at issue in a nuisance action is "the absolute duty not to
act in a way which unreasonably interferes with other persons' use and
enjoyment of their property."" As a result, some courts would maintain that "a
nuisance is a property action."70

58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 6 (2018).
Id.
67
A number ofjurisdictions that resist the Restatement's approach also maintain the traditional
definition of nuisance as simply something that interferes with the use and enjoyment of property.
See, e.g., Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Idaho 1995) (noting the statutory definition of a
nuisance as "[a]nything which is injurious to health or morals, or is indecent, or offensive to the
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary
manner, of any navigable lake, or river, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street,
or highway is a nuisance"); State ex rel. Fallis v. Mike Kelly Constr. Co., 638 P.2d 455, 456 n.4
(Okla. 1981) ("A nuisance consists in unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to perform a duty, which
act or omission either:" (1) "Annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of
others;" or (2) "Offends decency;" or (3) "Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or tends to obstruct,
or renders dangerous for passage, any lake or navigable river, stream, canal or basin, or any public
park, square, street or highway;" or (4) "In any way renders other persons insecure in life, or in the
use of property."); Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297,2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108, at *18 (R.I.
Super. Ct. July 5, 2005) ("A private nuisance involves an interference with the use and enjoyment
of land. It involves a material interference with the ordinary physical comfort or the reasonable use
of one's property.").
68
Booker v. Foose, 613 S.E.2d 94, 97 (W. Va. 2005).
69
Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 637 (N.D. 1992).
70
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 321 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
65

66
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There is a certain logical alignment in thinking that the focus should be
about land use: traditionally, rights in land are necessary to bring a suit for
nuisance.7 1 And recovery is based on "a significant harm to their property rights
or privileges caused by the interference." 2 To maintain a cause of action for
nuisance, a plaintiff must either have ownership or control of the land.73 Standing
is broad enough to encompass those who have an "interest in the use and
enjoyment of easements and profits." 74 Simply put, "[t]he concept of a private
nuisance does not exist apart from the interest of a landowner."
Additionally, courts continue to recognize the centrality of property to
the concept of a nuisance claim. As the Supreme Court of Michigan explained,
"[t]he essence of private nuisance is the protection of a property owner's or
occupier's reasonable comfort in occupation of the land in question."76 A
nuisance is an action that is "based on a disturbance of rights in land."7 7 Without
the focus on the use and enjoyment of land, 8 "the fact of personal injury, or of
interference with some purely personal right, is not enough" to establish a claim
for nuisance; such claims fall in tort more generally, but not in the law of

See Murphy v. Hillside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, No. CV 960254486S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1999, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 22, 1997) ("[A] private nuisance exists only where one is injured
in relation to a right which he enjoys by reason of his ownership of an interest in land. Accordingly,
a claim for private nuisance may be brought by one who enjoys ownership of an interest in land.").
The requirement in modem law does not focus on ownership, and indeed ignores the "quality of
the tenure." Id. at *7. A variety of property rights can support a claim for nuisance. Id. ("[F]or
private nuisance there is liability only to those who have property rights and privileges in respect
to the use and enjoyment of the land affected, including (a) possessors of land, (b) owners of
easements and profits in the land, and (c) owners of nonpossessory estates in the land that are
detrimentally affected by interferences with its use and enjoyment . . . . [P]ossessors of land
encompass 'not only owners of possessory estates in fee simple absolute, but also owners of any
possessory estate."').
71

72

Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198,201 (W. Va. 1989) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§§ 821E-F (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).

OF TORTS
7

Fielder v. Rice Constr. Co., 522 S.E.2d 13, 16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).

74

Id.

7

Sandifer Motors, Inc. v. City of Roeland Park, 628 P.2d 239, 242 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich. 1992).

76

City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 776 N.E.2d 368, 379 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
While the focus of a nuisance claim is land, where a land use is substantial and unreasonable
and causes personal injury to the neighbors, some jurisdictions allow recovery for those injuries.
See Koll-Irvine Ctr. Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Cty. of Orange, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664, 668 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994) ("But these are elements of damage which must be caused by an interference with a
property right .... [Diamages for private nuisance may include recovery for diminution in value
and for annoyance, inconvenience, or discomfort."); Bowers v. Westvaco Corp., 419 S.E.2d 661,
667 n.7 (Va. 1992) ("A litigant in a private nuisance action is entitled to recover, as an element of
damages, compensation for physical or emotional injuries resulting from a nuisance which has
endangered 'life or health.').
7

78
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nuisance, which is restricted to land." This restriction is appropriate because it
is the very nature of nuisance law to "provide[] a mechanism for resolving
conflicts between competing, simultaneous uses of nearby property by different
landowners."so Indeed, scholars continue to believe that nuisance law performs
a key function in land use control," as well as in environmental law.82
Courts refusing to adopt the Second Restatement's position tend to stick
to the traditional definition of nuisance as "a substantial and unreasonable
interference with the private use and enjoyment of another's land." 83 Such

Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Lilly Indus. v. Health-Chem Corp., 974 F. Supp. 702, 706 (S.D. Ind. 1997); see also Sowers
v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 294 P.3d 427, 431 (Nev. 2013) ("When deciding whether one's use of
his or her property is a nuisance to his neighbors, it is necessary to balance the competing interests
of the landowners, using a commonsense approach.") (quoting 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 13 (2012));
Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108, at *22 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5,
2005) ("Historically the law of private nuisance has been applied to conflicts between neighboring,
contemporaneous land uses.") (quoting Hydro-Mfg., Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950,957
(R.I. 1994)).
s
Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, NuisanceRules, and Finesas Land
Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 729 (1973) (describing how communities control land use
through community norms, including through the use of nuisance law).
82
For a discussion of the many uses of nuisances across a variety of different types of cases,
see Epstein, supra note 7. Nuisance law also fails to effectively protect the environment in many
contexts. See Butler, supranote 16, at 857-58 (2013) (arguing that nuisance can address water and
air pollution, but not the destruction of habitat or ecosystem services).
83
Browning v. Halle, 632 S.E.2d 29, 32 (W. Va. 2005) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Hendricks v.
Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198 (W. Va. 1989); see also Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., No. CIV-91525-TUC-ROS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17228, at *40 (D. Ariz. June 26, 1998) (noting that the
standard of substantial and unreasonable interference applies to private nuisance); Miller v.
Jasinski, 705 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) ("A nuisance is defined as conduct by one
landowner which unreasonably or unlawfully interferes with the use and enjoyment of the lands of
another and includes conduct on property which disturbs the peaceful, quiet, and undisturbed use
and enjoyment of nearby property."); Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 794 (Colo. App. 1984) ("To
demonstrate its existence a plaintiff must show that the defendant unreasonably and substantially
interfered with the use and enjoyment of his property."); Saadeh v. Stanton Rowing Found., Inc.,
912 So. 2d 28, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) ("A court examining a claim of nuisance must focus
not only upon legality, but also upon reasonableness of the use, 'as such use affects the public and
private rights of others' and 'must of necessity be determined from the facts and circumstances of
particular cases as they arise."') (citation omitted); Sumitomo Corp. of Am. v. Deal, 569 S.E.2d
608, 612 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that liability must exist, "however socially desirable the
conduct," provided that "the interference that is the consequence of the activity is substantial and
considered to be unreasonable"); Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. CAE-Link Corp., 622 A.2d
745, 750 (Md. 1993) ("Virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of the property may amount to
a nuisance so long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable and such as would be
offensive or inconvenient to the normal person."); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No.
1999-02590, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352, at *61 n.60 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000) (defining
nuisance in terms of a substantial and unreasonable interference); Dunlop v. Daigle, 444 A.2d 519,
520 (N.H. 1982) (defining nuisance in terms of substantial and unreasonable interferences); Sowers
7

8o
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approaches may also explicitly note that the doctrine includes unintentional acts.
The Maine Supreme Court, for example, noted that nuisance requires that
"[t]here was some interference with the use and enjoyment of the land of the kind
intended, although the amount and extent of that interference may not have been
anticipated or intended." 8 4 At its heart, the test is simply a question of property
as a social mechanism--nuisance is a balancing "between the rights of adjoining
property owners."ss Although often described as a tort, the law of nuisance
focuses on property rights, "recogniz[ing] the inherent conflict between the
rights of neighboring property owners."" This is precisely why the traditional
test, and the test maintained by a good number of jurisdictions, focuses on
reasonableness: "[t]he unreasonable use element seeks to balance those
[competing] rights.""
Additionally, courts may adopt a broader list of potential ways of
establishing nuisance liability. Michigan notes "countless ways to interfere with
the use and enjoyment of land including interference with the physical condition
of the land itself, disturbance in the comfort or conveniences of the occupant
v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 294 P.3d 427, 432 (Nev. 2013) ("To sustain a claim for private
nuisance, an interference with one's use and enjoyment of land must be both substantial and
unreasonable."); Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63, 66 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (defining private
nuisance in terms of substantial and unreasonable interference); O'Cain v. O'Cain, 473 S.E.2d 460,
466 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (applying the unreasonable interference standard); Post & Beam Equitie
Grp., L.L.C. v. Sunne Vill. Dev. Prop. Owners Ass'n, 124 A.3d 454, 465 (Vt. 2015) ("To prove a
nuisance, plaintiffs must demonstrate an interference with the use and enjoyment of another's
property that is both unreasonable and substantial."); Arnoldt v. Ashland Oil, 412 S.E.2d 795, 800
(W. Va. 1991) (applying Kentucky law and finding that "nuisance must be ascertained on the basis
of two broad factors, neither of which may in any case be the sole test to the exclusion of the other:
(1) the reasonableness of the defendant's use of his property, and (2) the gravity of harm to the
complainant.") (quoting Louisville Ref. Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181, 186 (Ky. 1960)).
Other courts continue to define nuisance in terms of the sic utero principle. See Radcliff Homes,
Inc. v. Jackson, 766 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) ("It is a general principle of law that every
person may make such use as he will of his own property, provided he uses it in such a manner as
not to injure others.") (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Dep't of Fish & Wildlife Res. v. Mayer, 357
S.W.2d 879, 881 (Ky. 1962)) (emphasis omitted); O'Cain, 473 S.E.2d at 465 (defining nuisance
in terms of not only unreasonable interference, but also "the right of one generally to make such
lawful use of his property as he may desire and the right of the other to be protected in the
reasonable enjoyment of his property"); Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, L.L.C., 411 S.W.3d 405,409
(Tenn. 2013) (citation omitted) ("The legal maxim--sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas--directs
landowners not to use their property in a way that injures the lawful rights of others. Thus . .
'every individual, indeed, has a right to make the most profitable use of that which is his or her
own, so that he or she does not injure others in the enjoyment of what is theirs.' This longstanding
principle is the cornerstone of a common-law nuisance claim.") (citation omitted).
8
Charlton v. Town of Oxford, 774 A.2d 366, 377 (Me. 2001).
85
Fletcher v. Independence, 708 S.W.2d 158, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
86
Peters v. ContiGroup, 292 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
87
Id. See generally Gregory C. Keating, Nuisance as a Strict Liability Wrong, 4 J. TORT L. 1
(2012).
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including his peace of mind, and threat of future injury that is a present menace
and interference with enjoyment."" Virginia defines a nuisance as "everything
that endangers life or health, or obstructs the reasonable and comfortable use of
property." 9 Washington follows an even broader rule established by statute,
where
[n]uisance consists in unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to
perform a duty, which act or omission either annoys, injures or
endangers the comfort, repose, health or safety of others, offends
decency, or unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or tends to
obstruct, or render dangerous for passage, any lake or navigable
river, bay, stream, canal or basin, or any public park, square,
street or highway; or in any way renders other persons insecure
in life, or in the use of property. 90
Courts that refuse the Second Restatement's position, emphasize the
distinction between condition or land use and conduct. In other words, "nuisance
is a condition and does not depend on the degree of care used; it depends on the
degree of danger existing with the best of care." 9 1 Oregon's Court of Appeals
Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich. 1992).
Bowers v. Westvaco Corp., 419 S.E.2d 661, 665 (Va. 1992) (quoting Barnes v. Graham Va.
Quarries, Inc., 132 S.E.2d 395, 397 (Va. 1963)). Tennessee follows much the same standard,
finding that a nuisance is "anything which annoys or disturbs the free use of one's property, or
which renders its ordinary use or physical occupation uncomfortable and extends to everything
that endangers life or health, gives offense to the senses, violates the laws of decency, or obstructs
the reasonable and comfortable use of property." Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355, 364
(Tenn. 2002) (quoting Pate v. City of Martin, 614 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tenn. 1981)). Hawaii, which
draws its standard from the common law generally, also approaches nuisance with a similar
definition. See Marsland v. Pang, 701 P.2d 175, 187 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985).
A nuisance has been variously defined to mean "that which unlawfully annoys
or does damage to another, anything that works hurt, inconvenience, or
damage, anything which annoys or disturbs one in the free use, possession, or
enjoyment of his property or which renders its ordinary use or physical
occupation uncomfortable, and anything wrongfully done or permitted which
injures or annoys another in the enjoyment of his legal rights."
88

89

Id.
Miotke v. Spokane, 678 P.2d 803, 816 (Wash. 1984).
91
Frank v. Envtl. Sanitation Mgmt., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. 1985). The emphasis on
outcomes over duties is an old one and traditional to the common law of nuisance. See, e.g., Stanley
v. Macon, 97 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 1957) ("The wrongfulness must have been in the acts
themselves, rather than in the failure to use the requisite degree of care in doing them, and therein
lies the distinction, under the facts of this case, between 'nuisance' and 'negligence."'); Foley v.
H. F. Farnham Co., 188 A. 708, 710 (Me. 1936) ("Nuisance is a violation of an absolute duty;
negligence, a failure to use the requisite degree of care in the particular circumstances."); Benson
v. Loehler, 178 A.2d 909, 911 (Md. 1962) (quoting Sherwood Bros., Inc. v. Eckard, 105 A.2d 207,
211 (Md. 1954) (citation omitted) ("A nuisance exists because of a violation of an absolute duty
so that it does not rest on the degree of care used but rather on the degree of danger existing with
90
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finds that nuisance "refers to the interest invaded and not to any type of culpable
conduct."92 Iowa, similarly,
long recognize[s] a distinction between the claim of nuisance
and the claim of negligence... . Negligence is a type of liability
forming conduct. A private nuisance is a tort. It is a substantial
and unreasonable interference with the interest of a private
person in the use and enjoyment of his land. It [is] called a type
of harm.93

the best of care."); Hinds v. City of Hannibal, 212 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Mo. 1948) ("[C]reating or
maintaining a nuisance is the violation of 'the absolute duty of refraining from the participating
acts, not merely the relative duty of exercising reasonable care, foresight, and prudence in their
performance."'); Pearson v. Kan. City, 55 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo. 1932) ("A nuisance does not rest
on the degree of care used, but on the degree of danger existing with the best of care."); Herman
v. City of Buffalo, 108 N.E. 451, 453 (N.Y. 1915) ("[T]he distinction. . . between nuisance and
negligence [is as follows: Nuisance] is a violation of an absolute duty, the other a failure to use the
degree of care required in the particular circumstances-a violation of a relative duty."); Harris v.
Findlay, 18 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938) ("In the creation or maintenance of a nuisance
the wrongfulness must be in the acts themselves, rather than in the failure to use the requisite degree
of care in doing them, and therein lies the distinction between 'nuisance' and 'negligence."');
Weakley Cty. v. Carney, 14 Tenn. App. 688, 693-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932) ("The distinction lies
in the fact that the creation or maintenance of a nuisance is the violation of an absolute duty, the
doing of an act which is wrongful in itself, whereas negligence is the violation of a relative duty,
the failure to use the degree of care required under the particular circumstances in connection with
an act or omission which is not of itself wrongful."); Flanagan v. Gregory & Poole, Inc., 67 S.E.2d
865, 871 (W. Va. 1951) ("An act done with the best of care may result in a nuisance. The creation
of a nuisance is the violation of an absolute duty. Negligence is the violation of a relative duty")
(citations omitted)).
92
Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63, 66 (Or. Ct. App. 1980). See also Milwaukee Metro.
Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee, 691 N.W.2d 658, 669 (Wis. 2005).
[A] cause of action in nuisance is predicated upon a particular type of injurious
consequence, not the wrongful behavior causing the harm. While it is
necessary to prove the underlying tortious conduct before liability may attach
for a nuisance, it is incorrect to speak of nuisance "as itself a type of liabilityforming conduct." As such, the first step in a nuisance analysis is proof of the
particular harm that defines a nuisance-the interference with a private interest
in the use and enjoyment of land or with a public right.
Id. (citation omitted).
9
Martins v. Interstate Power Co., No. 1-517 / 00-0791, 2002 Iowa App. LEXIS 586, at *5
(Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2002). Virginia, additionally, maintains that "[n]egligence and nuisance
are distinct legal concepts," thus, "[w]hile negligent acts may give rise to the dangerous condition,
the acts themselves do not constitute a nuisance." Chapman v. City of Va. Beach, 475 S.E.2d 798,
802 (Va. 1996). Delaware adopted the same approach, distinguishing nuisance and negligence. See
Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle Cty., No. 5106, 1983 Del. Ch. LEXIS 496, at *44 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 4, 1983) ("1) [N]egligence is not a necessary element of nuisance (though it may be an
element in a finding of nuisance per accidents)[;] 2) a defendant may not impair the reasonable use
of another's property or rights, though the reasonableness of another's use is determined by
weighing the conflicting interests of the parties involved; 3) a nuisance need not be, though it is
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Thus, when applying a reasonableness standard, courts are not looking at the
defendant's conduct. Indeed, "[t]o award damages, the defendant's conduct, in
and of itself, need not be unreasonable." Instead, the proper focus is on the
unreasonableness of the interference-the resulting harm."
The second edition of American Jurisprudence describes this trend,
explaining that "[a]ccording to some courts, the term 'nuisance' does not refer to
conduct but rather refers to the interests invaded, as well as to the consequences
of conduct-that is, the inconvenience to others, or the damage or harm inflicted,
rather than the type of conduct involved." 96 The treatise then finds that in such
jurisdictions "[t]here can be a nuisance claim without an underlying actionable
conduct, such as negligence, being proved, and such a claim can be established
without a showing of intentional conduct."" The explanation continues that,
"[i]n other words, a cause of action in nuisance is predicated upon a particular
type of injurious consequence, not the wrongful behavior causing the harm." 98
Confusingly, however, a number of jurisdictions that follow the Second
Restatement's position of requiring negligence to make a defendant liable for
unreasonable conduct also use similar language. In such jurisdictions, courts
apply the language of focusing on harm to explain how they differentiate
between negligence and nuisance. Thus, Wisconsin, for example, can say that
"[n]uisance arises when a particular type of harm is suffered, i.e., nuisance refers
to the particular interest that is invaded."" In other words, nuisance in such
jurisdictions is negligence that happens to cause harm to land.
Nuisance, then, for most jurisdictions, is not about conduct of the
defendant, but rather about the harms done to the plaintiff s land.1" In this way,
"[n]uisance describes an effect, not a cause of tort liability, so that conduct
antecedent to the interference may not be relevant to remedy."' 0 1 Therefore, "[i]t
not precluded from being, the result of an intentional violation of the plaintiff s interests."). Courts
also may take the same approach to public nuisance. See Dep't of Envtl. Res. v. PBS Coals, 534
A.2d 1130, 1136 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) quoting Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319
A.2d 871, 883 (Pa. 1974)) ("The absence of facts supporting concepts of negligence ... is not in
the least fatal to a finding of the existence of a common law public nuisance.").
94
Mayes v. Tabor, 334 S.E.2d 489, 490 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
95
Id
96
58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 2 (Supp. 2018).
97

Id.

98

Id.

Butler v. Advanced Drainage Sys., 717 N.W.2d 760, 770 (Wis. 2006).
'0
Fentress Families Tr. v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 81 Va. Cir. 67, 72 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2010) ("In
order for there to be an actionable nuisance, it is not necessary that there be a finding of negligence
9

or intentional wrongdoing.") (quoting CHARLES E. FRIEND, PERSONAL INJURY LAW IN VIRGINIA

451-52 (3d ed. 2003)).
101
Fletcher v. Independence, 708 S.W.2d 158, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). Alternatively,
negligence might not be entirely irrelevant. In Massachusetts, for example, the courts may use
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may be said that negligence is some act or omission in violation of a duty, while
a nuisance is a dangerous, unsafe, or offensive condition resulting from some act
or omission."10 2 Connecticut focuses on the condition directly, listing as the
elements of a cause of action for nuisance
(1) the condition complained of has a natural tendency to create
danger and inflict injury upon person and property; (2) the
danger created was a continuing one; (3) the use of the land was
unreasonable or unlawful; and (4) the existence of the nuisance
was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries and
damages. 103
Similarly, Minnesota defines nuisance by statute, "in terms of the resultant harm
rather than in terms of the kind of conduct by a defendant which causes the
harm."'" In Maryland, "a nuisance claim [does] not depend upon proof of
negligence of an offending landowner: nuisance focuses not on the possible
negligence of the defendant but on whether there has been unreasonable
interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his or her own property."'0 5
Although taking a slightly different route, the courts of North Dakota
reach a similar result in terms of separating nuisance and negligence, but defining
the duty of care in nuisance as an absolute duty that one has as a landowner or
neighbor. The North Dakota Supreme Court explained that "[t]he creation or
maintenance of a nuisance is a violation of an absolute duty, the doing of an act
that is wrongful in itself."'06 The Court contrasted nuisance with negligence,
which the Court found "is a violation of a relative duty, the failure to use the
degree of care required under particular circumstances in connection with an act
or omission that is not of itself wrongful."o 7 This means, then, that "[n]uisance
is a condition and not an act or failure to act, so that if a wrongful condition

negligence as a part of the determination of "reasonableness of use of land," but the courts still
maintain that negligence "is not determinative of the existence of a private nuisance." DeSanctis
v. Lynn Water & Sewer Comm'n, 666 N.E.2d 1292, 1296 (Mass. 1996).
102
Martins v. Interstate Power Co., No. 1-517 / 00-0791, 2002 Iowa App. LEXIS 586, at *6
(Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2002).
103
Accashian v. City of Danbury, No. XOICV 970147228S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 36, at
*24 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1999).
1"
Highview N. Apartments v. Cty. of Ramsey, 323 N.W.2d 65, 70 (Minn. 1982).
1o5
Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conference Ass'n, 26 A.3d 931, 948 (Md. 2011).
10
Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 637 (N.D. 1992) (quoting Knoffv. Am. Crystal Sugar
Co., 380 N.W.2d 313 (N.D. 1986)).
107
Id.
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exists, the person responsible for its existence is liable for resulting damage to
others." 0
In this approach to nuisance, "[a] defendant's negligence, intention,
design or motive are immaterial to his liability for nuisance." 0 Not only is
negligence "not needed to prove a nuisance," negligence is not necessarily
evidence of a nuisance.'o Instead, "negligence will only support a finding of
nuisance when it constitutes an unreasonable use of land.""' Maryland chooses
to focus "not on the possible negligence of the defendant but on whether there
has been unreasonable interference with the plaintiff s use and enjoyment of his
or her property," which must "cause actual physical discomfort and
annoyance.""' North Carolina pursues the same approach, finding that "while
the same act or omission may constitute negligence as well as give rise to a cause
of action for private nuisance per accidens, a nuisance does not require
negligence."" Iowa, similarly, explains that, "negligence is not necessarily one
of the material elements of nuisance. Negligence is not vital to the establishment
of an action based on nuisance."l 4 More specifically, if the focus is on the land
use and its appropriateness to the context, then the behavior of the defendant is
irrelevant; this means: "liability for nuisance, unlike liability for negligence,
exists regardless of the degree of care exercised to avoid injury.""s As the
Virginia courts have repeatedly explained, "[a] nuisance, however careful it is

los
Id. A number of courts use similar language, distinguishing nuisance from negligence by
pointing to the fact that a nuisance is about a "condition rather than an act or failure to act." 58 AM.
JUR. 2D Nuisances § 3 (Supp. 2018).
'0
Frank v. Envtl. Sanitation Mgmt., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876, 880 n.3 (Mo. 1985).
110
Id. at 882. See also Hilliard v. Huntsville, 585 So. 2d 889, 892 (Ala. 1991) ("As a general
rule, liability for damages caused by a nuisance does not depend upon proof of negligence and may
exist even though there has been no negligence.").
n1
687 S.W.2d at 882.
112
Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. CAE-Link Corp., 622 A.2d 745, 750 (Md.
1993). The Maryland Supreme Court explains the relationship between negligence and nuisance
further: "Negligence is not involved in an action with respect to nuisance. The existence of a
nuisance is not affected by the intent of its creator not to injure anyone." Id. at 758 (citations
omitted). The Court concludes, "Negligence and nuisance are distinct concepts and the defendant's
negligence or failure to act reasonably is not an essential element in a nuisance action. Nuisance is
a condition and does not depend on the degree of care used." Id.
113
Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F. Supp. 355, 368 (M.D. N.C. 1997). However, the Court
goes on in the same opinion to note that liability comes from negligence, recklessness or ultrahazardous conditions, which may suggest that a non-negligent or fully accidental act is not covered.
Id.
114
Martins v. Interstate Power Co., No. 1-517, 2002 Iowa App. LEXIS 586, at *7 (Iowa Ct.
App. Apr. 10, 2002).
115
Padilla v. Lawrence, 685 P.2d 964, 968 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
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conducted is unlawful, and where a nuisance exists, it is immaterial whether the
nuisance was created by, or operated with negligence or reasonable care."116
Instead, rather than focusing on the conduct of the actor, the court
focuses on the land use itself."' The court looks at the land use and asks the
consequences to the neighbor, asking whether those are reasonable in the social
context. The Missouri Court of Appeals explains the approach this way: "It may
facilitate a pleader to articulate the nuisance effect-the unreasonable use- by
averments in terms of breach of duty of care, intentional conduct, or other theory
of action, but it is the unreasonable use determined upon a balance of interests,
and not a formal category of action, which determines a nuisance."11s The Court
concludes, "[t]hus, unreasonable use-and hence private nuisance-may be
proven per se: a use unreasonable as a matter of law from the very
circumstances.""' Under such an approach, "[s]o long as the interference is
substantial and unreasonable, and such as would be offensive or inconvenient to
the normal person, virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of the property
may amount to a nuisance."' 20
Reasonableness, then, allows courts to focus on the appropriateness of
land uses rather than on the conduct of the defendant or her mental state. West
Virginia, for example, has found that "private nuisance includes conduct that is
intentional and unreasonable, negligence or reckless, or that results in an
abnormally dangerous conditions or activities in an inappropriateplace."21 The
Arizona Supreme Court has emphasized this focus of nuisance law: "[i]t hardly
admits a doubt that, in determining the question as to whether a lawful
occupation is so conducted as to constitute a nuisance as a matter of fact, the
locality and surroundings are of the first importance."'2 2 To make the concept
concrete, the Court gave this example: "[a] business which is not per se a public
nuisance may become such by being carried on at a place where the health,
116
Fentress Families Tr. v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 81 Va. Cir. 67, 72-73 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2010)
(quoting Charles E. Friend, PersonalInjury Law in Virginia, 451-52 (3d ed. 2003)).
117
North Carolina has precisely such a focus on land use. The rule is that,

while the same act or omission may constitute negligence as well as give rise
to a cause of action for private nuisance per accidens, a nuisance does not
require negligence. Rather, a nuisance is the improper use of one's own
property in a way which injures the land or other right of one's neighbor.
982 F. Supp. at 368.
118
Fletcher v. Indep., 708 S.W.2d 158, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
119

Id.

Oliver v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198, 200 (W. Va. 1989) (emphasis added). Utah also
follows this approach, finding liability for "activities in an inappropriate place." Turnbaugh v.
Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
122
Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706 (Ariz. 1972) (quoting MacDonald
v. Perry, 90 P.2d 994 (Ariz. 1939)).
120
121
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comfort, or convenience of a populous neighborhood is affected."12 3 Liability
then depends on the circumstances of the land use: "[w]hat might amount to a
serious nuisance in one locality by reason of the density of the population, or
character of the neighborhood affected, may in another place and under different
surroundings be deemed proper and unobjectionable."l 24
Courts generally take this approach to nuisance law, emphasizing the
context of the land use. Kansas, for example, adds to the list of ways that
something can be a nuisance-the possibility that an activity that is "abnormal
and out of place in its surroundings."l 25 This approach is consistent with nuisance
law historically. It has long been the rule that a nuisance is determined by the
context. As the Supreme Court of Tennessee explained, "an activity or use of
property that constitutes a nuisance in one context may not constitute a nuisance
in another context."l2 6 The Court instead found, "[w]hether an activity or use of
property amounts to an unreasonable invasion of another's legally protected
interests 'depends on the circumstances of each case, such as the character of the
surroundings."'127
V. DOES NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE BELONG IN NUIsANCE?

Having discussed the Second Restatement's position, and the minority
of courts that adopt this position, and the majority that resists, Section V.A turns
to the larger philosophical inquiry at hand: which position is a better approach
for courts to take to nuisance law? The remainder of this Section discusses the
odd situation of nuisance law and the boundary between tort and property law.
To emphasize how much a change in intent requirements matters for property
law, Section V.B discusses how scholars and jurists have reacted to a similar
change in British law.
These discussions provide a background for the later portions of this
article, which ultimately argue (1) that the quintessential nature of nuisance
sounds in property rather than in tort, and (2) that for the sake of robust protection
of our private property rights, and particularly the right to exclude, the better
approach to nuisance is the majority position that rejects the Second Restatement
conduct requirement.

123

Id.

124

Id

Rogers v. Allen Utils., Inc., No. 59,102, 1986 Kan. App. LEXIS 1526, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App.
Nov. 20, 1986). Wyoming, similarly, assigns liability for nuisance where the land use is "abnormal
and out-of place in its surroundings." Wilson v. Amoco Corp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 969, 977 (D. Wyo.
1998).
126
Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, LLC, 411 S.W.3d 405, 415 (Tenn. 2013).
127
Id. at 415-16.
125
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A. Does the Unique Situation ofLand Matter, or is Nuisance a Property
Claim or a Tort Claim?
At the outset of discussing the importance of the property context of a
nuisance claim, it is appropriate to consider more generally how nuisance sits at
the boundary between tort and property law. Tort and property form two of the
most expansive and central fields of law, and yet we remain unable to define with
precision the outlines and foundations of either concept. 12 8 While property theory
has developed at a rapid pace within the last decade, we seem better able to say
what we want property to do than to clarify precisely what property is. 129 Tort
fares no better, and indeed, we may be "incapable of understanding tort law." 130
We struggle all the more when we try to articulate the boundary between them.
Some years ago, Professors Calabresi and Melamed proposed
distinguishing the two fields via property and liability rules, and while this
contributed an important foundation, the boundary remains blurred.131 Calabresi
and Melamed's article has remained a central point of discussion since
publication.1 32 Yet, scholars have never been comfortable accepting that the
property versus liability rules framework fully and accurately articulates the
property-tort divide.'3 3 This past year, Calabresi again highlighted the lack of
consensus on this issue by tackling the problem of the "resurgence of torts
viewed as a purely private legal arrangement," and arguing for a "public
meaning" of torts via liability rules that are collectively set.134
See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8 (illuminating first the intertwined
problems of defining property and tort). Calabresi and Melamed note that prior to their article,
property and torts were very rarely approached from any unified perspective. Id.
129
Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends andMeans in American
PropertyLaw, 94 CoRNELL L. REv. 959, 959 (2009) (finding that "[m]ost of us have a sense that
property is doing something important, but it does it in a somewhat mysterious way").
130
Nicholas McBride, Rights and the Basis of Tort Law, in RIGHTS AND PRiVATE LAW 331, 332
(Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2011).
131
E.g. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8.
132
See generally Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory ofLegal Rights, 95
YALE L.J. 1335 (1986); Richard Craswell, PropertyRules andLiabilityRules in Unconscionability
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1993); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property
Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1996); Henry E.
Smith, Propertyand PropertyRules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1719 (2004); James E. Krier & Stewart J.
Schwab, PropertyRules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv.
440 (1995).
133
Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View ofthe Cathedral: The Dominance ofPropertyRules, 106
YALE L.J. 2091, 2092 (1997); Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400,
1400 (2007).
134
Guido Calabresi, A Broader View of the Cathedral:The Significance of the Liability Rule,
Correctinga Misapprehension,77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 & 4 (2014). For a taxonomy of
the private or individual rights views of property, see Butler, supra note 15, at 856-63 (2013).
128
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Approaching the question from the torts perspective, Nicholas McBride
finds that the "vast amount of academic writing on the nature and basis of tort
law .. .produced in the last few decades" is "a sign of sickness," indicating that
we are "incapable of understanding tort law.""' Indeed, McBride concludes that,
by the early 1990s, the "community of tort academics was stuck firmly in the
wilderness.""' If we were lost theoretically by the mid-90s, recent real-world
encounters with practical problems such as climate change have only revealed
how much we struggle with central concepts such as harm, causation, and
responsibility in tort."' Having failed to define either property or tort to our
satisfaction, we struggle all the more when we try to articulate their boundary.
In probing the edges of the property-tort divide scholars have repeatedly
utilized nuisance as a primary case study, following Calabresi and Melamed's
assertion that nuisance is awkwardly poised on the boundary of the two fields."'
Nuisance, they explained, is "one of the most interesting areas where the question
of who will be given an entitlement, and how it will be protected, is in frequent
issue." 3 9 Key cases such as Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.' 40 and Spur
Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.141 encouraged this focus by
shifting rules in ways seen as moving nuisance law away from property rules and
more toward liability rules. 42 Other scholars have followed Calabresi's lead and
used nuisance as the primary case study for exploring the property-tort
boundary. 4 3

13s
Nicholas McBride, Rights and the Basis of TortLaw, in RirHTs
(Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2011).
136
Id. at 332.

AND PRIVATE LAw

331, 332

Douglas A. Kysar, What ClimateChange CanDo About TortLaw, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2011).
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1092. Nuisance as the primary case study is
logical because, as Lee Anne Fennell explains, property rights tend to be "retained in their entirety
until someone raises an issue regarding an actual or potential incompatible land use." Lee Anne
Fennell, Propertyand Precaution,4 J. TORT L. 1, 1 (2011).
139
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1115.
140
257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970).
141
494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).
142
Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York Court ofAppeal, 18501915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 301 (1990).
143
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, PropertyRights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of
the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001) (using pollution as the primary example of harm to
a neighboring property); Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and
Economics, and Natural PropertyRights, 85 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1409 (2010) (focusing
on land-use torts, of which nuisance cases form a substantial part); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713,
754 (1996) (using industrial pollution and nuisance cases as examples).
137

138
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Calabresi and Melamed proposed demarcating this boundary by
distinguishing between property and liability rules." Their seminal article on
the subject focused on how entitlements change hands, explaining how the level
of protection received by the entitlement depends on whether property or liability
rules are applied. Calabresi and Melamed's scheme focused on the remedies, or
"the manner in which entitlements are protected," as a primary point of
distinction between property rules and tort rules.1 45 Property remedies (i.e.,
injunctions and supra-compensatory remedies) made taking the entitlement
effectively impossible or set the remedy so high that taking would be
economically illogical.'4 6 Such remedies emphasized the quintessential property
characteristic of the owner's right to exclude.
On the other hand, liability rules allowed for violation of the owner's
right to exclude. Remedies did not punish so much as set compensation at a
collectively determined price. As a result, liability rules provided some relief
against the "hold out" problem of a single owner refusing to sell and preventing
a project more highly valued socially from proceeding.' 47 The two rules then
align with property rules' focus on protecting entitlements and allowing takings
only in the narrowest of circumstances, and tort rules' focus on compensating
when a taking has occurred accidentally or must occur to facilitate a higher social
good.
Calabresi and Melamed focused on entitlements and remedies to
distinguish property rules from liability rules. When property rules apply, the
owner is the exclusive gatekeeper-the property can only be taken or infringed
upon if the owner willingly sells.' 4 8 On the other hand, if liability rules apply,
then the owner's exclusive gatekeeping function yields-someone may take or
invade the property, so long as they pay an objectively set value.' 49
Prior to Calabresi and Melamed's work, Frank Michelman illustrated
three potential rule choices within the nuisance context.5 0 This breadth of rules
resulted from the possible permutations of property and liability rules that might
protect either the entitlement to quiet enjoyment of the land or the entitlement to
pollute. In elucidating Michelman's rule choices by applying them in a
hypothetical context, Calabresi and Melamed introduced two imaginary
144

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1092.

145

Id

1"

Id. at 1106A8.

147

Id. at 1107-09.

148

Id. at 1105.

149
Id. at 1105-06. More recently, Calabresi has clarified that the value for the property set by
the liability rule is more than objective. It is a collectively set value, which emphasizes the public
function of liability rules. Calabresi, supra note 134, at 4.
150
Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's
Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 676 (1971).
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characters: Taney as a polluter and Marshall as a neighboring landowner. 5 1
Subsequently, they developed a further example to introduce a fourth type of
rule.1 52
Calabresi and Melamed's scheme of rule choices focused on the
remedies, or "the manner in which entitlements are protected," as a primary point
of distinction between property rules and tort rules.' 5 3 For our purposes, the
important points from Calabresi and Melamed's work are the division between
property and tort rules and the types of protections that are afforded in the two
distinct realms. Property law has historically provided the stronger protections
when compared to tort law. For this reason, it matters that courts are struggling
against adopting a negligence standard and maintaining that the quintessential
nature of nuisance sounds in property rather than in tort.
B. Reactions to the British Shift to Negligence-basedLiabilityfor
HazardousEscapesfrom Property
One way to approach the question of the significance of the shift to
negligence-based liability is to consider a similar development in British law that
caused quite a stir. In British law, courts traditionally protected property rights
and attributed liability under a doctrine called "the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher."S4
The rule might be otherwise titled, "the rule against lion tamers," for the rule is
one of unnatural capture or containment and subsequent escape. In Fletcherv.
Rylands,'" Justice Blackburn wrote that the "rule of law is, that the person who
for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything
likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril.""' While lion
tamers are unusual, Rylands v. Fletcher'57 addressed a much more common
occurrence for land owners: the containment and release of water.' For well
over a century, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcherprevailed, allocating liability based
on the containment, escape, and subsequent damage to the plaintiff rather than
considering any questions of the foreseeability of those particular damages.5 9

152

Calabresi & Melamed, supranote 8, at 1115.
Id at 1116.

153

Id. at 1092.

'5

Kutner, supra note 54, at 74.
(1866) 1 LRE 265 (HL) 279 (Eng.).

151

155
156

Id

157

(1868) 3 LRE 330 (1L) (appeal taken from Eng.), affg Fletcher v. Rylands (1866) 1 LRE

265.

1
159

KtId.
Kutner, supra note 54, at 74.
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The longstanding rule changed with the House of Lords' decision in
Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather Plc." In the Cambridge
Water Co. case, the House of Lords shifted the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher to
align with other tort rules. The primary change was that the damages now had to
be foreseeable. This change then meant that the damages from escape and entry
onto a neighbor's property were treated more like a negligence inquiry and less
like a trespass to property.
Scholars and theorists ofproperty and tort responded immediately to this
development. In the words of Peter Kutner, the development "[could] be
described without exaggeration as 'bombshell.""" British law of nuisance does
not equate nuisance with negligence. Instead, there is no particular fault required
on the part of the defendant; liability is akin to strict liability.1 62 Courts balance
that strict approach by limiting damages in nuisance claims damages by way of
applying the concept of foreseeability.1 63 In adopting the new position limiting
Rylands liability to foreseeable damages, the House of Lords justified the
decision by pointing to how this aligned the Rylands rule with the British law of
nuisance. 64

For the purposes of British property law, the change was significant. The
primary question is whether the concern facing the court is about the mental state
of the defendant or about the harm that is done to property. As Maria Hook put
it, "[i]f reasonable foreseeability of harm is an element of nuisance, the function
of the tort is to impose liability for wrongful conduct as opposed to wrongful
damage." 65 The very heart of the concept of foreseeability is to limit the duty of
the actor-"even harmful action cannot meaningfully be viewed as 'wrong' if
the actor could not possibly have contemplated that the action might produce the
harm."1 6 6

In the next Part, this article argues that British scholars were correct to
emphasize the importance of the shift. This article argues that in terms of
160
161

[1994] 2 AC 264 (HL) (Eng.).
Kutner, supra note 54.

Id. at 92 n.132.
Id. at 97 n.156.
164
Id. at 86-87. In the American context, foreseeability occupies a prominent role within the
field of torts; notably, however, the Restatement (Third) argued that foreseeability as a nuisance
162
163

concept should be marginalized. See David G. Owen, FiguringForeseeability,44 WAKE FOREST

L. REv. 1277, 1277-78 (2009). Owen believes that the concept occupies the appropriate place in
American tort law currently and, therefore, disagrees with the Restatement (Third)'s position. Id.
165

Maria Hook, Reasonable Foreseeabilityof Harm as an Element of Nuisance, 47 VICT. U.

WELLINGTON L. REV. 267, 267 (2016). Hook's article addresses British common law
developments.
166
Owen, supra note 164, at 1277-78. Owen notes that foreseeability is one of tort's "most
vital moral tethers" because it provides torts with "principle and boundaries" and thereby "defines
the nature and scope of responsibility in tort." Id. at 1277.
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American property law, there is indeed a significant change in moving nuisance
law to align with negligence and that such a change is not beneficial. Such a
change would improperly reduce property rights and unreasonably expose
property owners to damages from neighbors that are unlikely to be compensated.
VI. THE HISTORICAL DOCTRINE OF NUISANCE AND
THE CENTRALITY OF PROPERTY

At the heart of the debate about nuisance law is nothing less than the
very core of what the cause of action means and what it protects in the general
scheme of private law. If nuisance law is able to dictate the boundaries of
property rights, then there is nothing logical about aligning nuisance law to the
remainder of tort law. This Part argues that nuisance is quintessentially about
property, not about tort. The primary function of nuisance law is to limit the
normally rather unlimited freedom that a property owner has to use her land as
she likes. If nuisance law is, as the history books would tell us, about the idea of
not using your property to injure another (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas),'7
then the heart of the concept is less about the general idea of wrongful conduct
and more about the relational nature of property.
Section VI.A, below, discusses the property origins of nuisance law,
drawing on historical sources. Section VI.B discusses the importance of broad
nuisance protections for the sake of the right to exclude in property law. Section
C turns to the primary objection to broad nuisance protections: the idea that it is
too akin to strict liability.
A.

The Property OriginsofNuisance Law

The original assize from which nuisance emerged was described as the
Assize of Novel Disseisin.'16 The purposes of this cause of action related directly
to the rights in land.1 69 In particular, the assize assigned liability for interference
with easements or natural rights in land.170 This is the cause of action that
eventually became our traditional cause for interference with the use and
enjoyment of land.17' The assize originated for the purposes of."protect[ing] the

Within nuisance law, this Roman principle famously came into the British common law
when Sir Edward Coke applied it within Aldred's Case to explain the boundaries of nuisance law.
Aldred's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 816.
168
JOHN BEAMES, A TRANSLATION OF GLANVILLE 270-77 (1900).
169
Id. at 270-71.
170
See Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law ofNuisance: Past, Present, andFuture,
54 ALB. L. REv. 189, 193 (1990) (discussing the origins of the assize of nuisance).
171
Id.
167
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possession of freeholders."l7 2 hn short, nuisance "protected the rights of
landowners to use and enjoy their property free from interference by others.""'
One of the ideals of nuisance law is to compensate landowners where the
nuisance would "diminish the comfort, enjoyment, or value of the property which
is affected."174
Historically, nuisance law not only provided an opportunity for an
individual landowner to obtain damages and/or an injunction, but also provided
a mechanism for land use planning before the advent of comprehensive zoning
laws.175 What was "disagreeable and uncomfortable" for the purposes of
nuisance law, depended on the neighborhood and its qualities before the alleged
nuisance.17 6 As a result, where the air quality was already bad, the addition of
another, marginal interference would be negligible.' 77 This meant that the
potential for nuisance liability encouraged de facto zoning-a "like with like"
grouping of land uses that collected more disruptive uses, such as industrial ones,
away from quieter ones, such as residential uses.17 Nuisance law did not
determine whether a type of conduct was unreasonable, but rather "where an
7
activity can or cannot take place.""'
To determine whether conduct was
reasonable, the court looked to the location as well as priority of occupation.' 8 0
As a result, "[w]hat may be a nuisance in one locality may not in another.""'
Property rights were central to the concept of nuisance law. Courts
justified the initial severity of nuisance doctrines in terms of the affirmation of
the strength of property rights: "No one has a right to erect works which are a
nuisance to a neighboring owner, and then say he has expended large sums of
money in the erection of his works, while the neighboring property is
comparatively of little value."l 82 This court ultimately concluded: "The
neighboring owner is entitled to the reasonable and comfortable enjoyment of
his property, and if his rights in this respect are invaded, he is entitled to the
172
Julian Morris, Climbing out of the Hole: Sunsets, Subjective Value, the Environment, and
the English Common Law, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 343, 347-48 (2003).
173
Id. at 348.
174
St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, [1865] 11 HL 642 (Eng.).
175
J.H. Beuscher & Jerry W. Morrison, JudicialZoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955
Wis. L. REV. 440, 443 (1955).
176
R. v. Neville, (1791) 170 Eng. Rep. 102.
177
Id.
178
See Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198, 201 (W. Va. 1989) (focusing on the "use of
property in relation to the particular locality").
179
See Morris, supranote 172, at 352.
180
Martin Bldg. Co. v. Imperial Laundry Co., 124 So. 82, 84 (Ala. 1929).
181
Hall v. N. Montgomery Materials, LLC, 39 So.3d 159, 173 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (citation
omitted).
182
Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 20 A. 900, 902 (Md. 1890).
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protection of the law, let the consequences be what they may." `3 This strict rule
was necessary, according to the traditional rule because "to hold otherwise would
be to compel the citizen to abandon his property at the demand of the public
convenience."' 8 4
A number of historical points also support the argument that nuisance
emerged as a distinct cause of action from negligence because of the need for a
cause of action that (1) addressed liability for indirect consequences of the
defendant's actions rather than the direct consequences covered by trespass, (2)
addressed the context of land uses specifically, and (3) securely protected the
private property owner's right to maintain possession and exclude others.
B.

Why Limiting Nuisance Law Matters?: The Right to Exclude

The right to exclude is a key concept, if not the defining concept, of
private property. According to Thomas Merrill, "[d]eny someone the exclusion
right and they do not have property."' Calabresi and Melamed linked the right
to exclude with property rules, as opposed to liability rules.' 86 This strong
statement makes sense given that "the right to exclude is best understood as a
gatekeeper right-the owner's right to determine the use of the thing."' The
common law protected the right to exclude not only through the law of trespass,
but also through the law of nuisance.' Notably, those protections are strong.
The common law regularly punished violations of the right to exclude with
"injunctions and supracompensatory damages."' 8 9
If nuisance law protects the right to exclude, then any reduction in the
rights to sue under nuisance indicates an equal reduction in the rights that exist
in private property across those jurisdictions. Where the courts have adopted the
Second Restatement's approach, nuisance aligns with concepts of negligence and
foreseeability of damages, and in those jurisdictions, nuisance is simply "a tort
about wrongful conduct."'" Nuisance loses its focus on property law and loses
the very reason that the liability historically was very strong-because nuisance
law protected an owner from invasions and interference that prevented her from
the use and enjoyment of her land.

183

Id. at 902.

Seacord v. People, 13 N.E. 194, 201 (Ill. 1887).
'
Merrill, supranote 15, at 730.
186
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1092.
187
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion andPropertyRules in the Law ofNuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965,
972(2004).
184

188
189
190

Id. at 972-73.
Id. at 973.
Hook, supranote 165, at 276.
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Aligning nuisance law with other tort concepts such as negligence and
foreseeability may also prompt other changes in the law that also impact property
rights. One important implication of aligning nuisance with negligence liability
is the likelihood that other negligence concepts will continue to erode liability
(and therefore property rights as well). For example, a number of courts that
apply a negligence-based approach to nuisance also allow contributory
negligence as a defense to the nuisance action.19
C. Answers to the Strict Liability Objection to BroadNuisanceProtection
The Second Restatement's approach contained, in part, a criticism of
traditional nuisance law: a suggestion that strict liability was too much.' 92 The
Second Restatement then suggested that nuisance law needed to modernize to an
approach that was not strict liability, in fitting with the overall trend of tort law
moving away from strict liability.' 93 There are a number of problems with this
position. First, as noted above, if nuisance law quintessentially protects property
rights, and the right to exclude, then there is no particular reason that nuisance
should be doctrinally aligned with other types of tort law. Indeed, the uniqueness
of those circumstances argue against such an alignment, suggesting instead that
nuisance would logically deviate so as to adapt itself to our expectations for
property rights.
Second, the Second Restatement's argument presumes that nuisance
liability under the traditional rule was, in fact, strict liability. This article argues
that this statement is not particularly accurate for two reasons: (1) traditional
nuisance doctrine contained elements that already contextualized the inquiry,
allowed for discretion, and softened liability; and (2) the overall trend of modern
nuisance law has been to introduce even more contextualization, softening, and
discretion through the advent of balancing tests within the primafacie case.

191
Sandifer Motors, Inc. v. Roeland Park, 628 P.2d 239, 246-47 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). This is,
of course, limited to those cases in which the alleged ground of liability for nuisance is based on
negligence rather than, for example, strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity. See id.;
Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Elec. Coop., 548 N.W.2d 829, 835 (Wis. 1996) (citations omitted)
("[W]hen the harm is intentional or the result of recklessness, contributory negligence is not a
defense."). The Second Restatement also addresses the potential uses of contributory negligence
as a defense in nuisance actions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840B (AM. LAW INST.
1979).
192
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
1
Id.
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The Assumption of Strict Liability in the Historical Doctrine of
Nuisance

The Second Restatement's discussion of the proposed change to
nuisance law presumes that, traditionally, nuisance was associated with a strict
liability approach. Depending on your perspective, this statement is both accurate
and inaccurate. The statement is accurate if one relies on a definition of strict
liability that does not mean that liability is without limitation, but only that it is
liability without proving fault or negligence. 19 4 Under this definition, traditional
nuisance law was aligned with strict liability in that the elements of the cause of
action did not require proving fault or negligence.
Notably, courts in nuisance cases have long stated that there is not a
relative duty in nuisance cases, but rather an absolute duty. Courts today continue
to repeat this language, stating that nuisance is an "absolute duty" and one that
does not "rest on the degree of care used."' With that said, courts in these

194
This is a common approach to defining strict liability according to some theorists. See, e.g.,
Hook, supra note 165, at 276.
195
See Cudworth v. Midcontinent Commc'ns, 380 F.3d 375, 383 (8th Cir. 2004) ("The duty
which gives rise to a nuisance claim is the absolute duty not to act in a way which unreasonably
interferes with other persons' use and enjoyment of their property."); Cae-Link Corp. v. Wash.
Suburban Sanitary Comm'n., 602 A.2d 239, 240 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1992) (citations omitted)
("[A] nuisance exists because of a violation of an absolute duty so that it does not rest on the degree
of care used."); Little v. Union Tr. Co., 412 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (citations
omitted) ("[A] nuisance exists because of a violation of an absolute duty so that it does not rest on
the degree of care used."); McKay ex rel. McKay v. Boyd Constr. Co., 571 So.2d 916, 921 (Miss.
1990)
The creation or maintenance of a nuisance is a violation of an absolute duty,
the doing of an act which is wrongful in itself, whereas negligence is a
violation of a relative duty, the failure to use the degree of care required under
particular circumstances in connection with an act or omission which is not of
itself wrongful.
Id.
Hale v. Ward Cty., 818 N.W.2d 697, 703 (N.D. 2012) (citations omitted) ("The duty which gives
rise to a nuisance claim is the absolute duty not to act in a way which unreasonably interferes with
other persons' use and enjoyment of their property."); Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 637
(N.D. 1992) (citations omitted); West v. Nat'l Mines Corp., 336 S.E.2d 190, 196 (W. Va. 1985)
(citations omitted) ("The creation of a nuisance is the violation of an absolute duty. Negligence is
the violation of a relative duty."); see also Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co.,
646 N.W.2d 777, 792 n.21 (Wis. 2002) (citations omitted)
Nuisance and negligence are different kinds of torts. A nuisance does not rest
on the degree of care used, for that presents a question of negligence, but on
the degree of danger existing even with the best of care.... To constitute a
nuisance, the wrongfulness must have been in the acts themselves rather than
in the failure to use the requisite degree of care in doing them, and therein lies
the distinction ... between nuisance and negligence. The one is a violation of
an absolute duty; the other a failure to use the degree of care required in the
particular circumstances-a violation of a relative duty.
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instances do not seem to be pointing to the fact that there is nothing to soften
strict liability in nuisance law, but rather courts are simply trying to make clear
the fact that there is a distinction between negligence and nuisance.
On the other hand, the concept of strict liability in whole references the
idea of liability that is without limitations that would allow a defendant to both
acknowledge the damage and escape from liability. In this type of approach, it is
not accurate to say that nuisance law aligned with strict liability, at least not once
the concept of reasonableness had been included within the elements.
Certainly, courts from time to time discussed nuisance liability as
strict,' 6 probably because they meant in comparison to the behavior-oriented
position of negligence law. With that said, nuisance liability was never
completely strict. Subsets of nuisance law were strict-liability for abnormally
dangerous activities or for the escape of something unnatural and contained that
later damages a neighbor. Outside of those subsets, however, nuisance law was
not unlimited. Rather, two doctrines limited nuisance liability: (1) the conduct
had to be unreasonable, and (2) the injury had to be substantial.
Reasonableness introduced two important limitations to liability. First,
reasonableness allowed discretion for the court. Second, reasonableness turned
the inquiry into one that was cultural and contextualized: "As to what is a
reasonable use of one's own property cannot be defined by any certain general
rules, but must depend upon the circumstances of each case."'9 7 General rules
are not helpful because "[a] use of property in one locality and under some
circumstances may be lawful and reasonable, which, under other circumstances,
would be unlawful, unreasonable and a nuisance."" No general rule would
suffice; reasonableness had to be fitted to the circumstances to make a
determination on whether or not a land use constituted a nuisance: "There can be
no fixed standard as to what noise constitutes a nuisance, and the circumstances
of the case must necessarily influence the decision . . . . The location and

surroundings must be considered."'9 9
Reasonableness is a matter of the context of an action. Thinking in these
terms, it makes sense that courts would not be particularly looking to the degree
of care used in operation of some particular land use, but rather the choice of that
land use for its circumstances. Thus, it historically made sense to say: "In the
creation or maintenance of a nuisance the wrongfulness must be in the acts

Id.
197

See Kurtz, supra note 23; Lewin, supra note 24, at 779.
Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 577 (N.Y. 1876).

198

Id.
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199
Hatch v. W.S. Hatch Co., 283 P.2d 217, 218-19) (Utah 1955) (quoting 39 AM. JUR.
Nuisances § 47, at 331).
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themselves, rather than in the failure to use the requisite degree of care in doing
200
them, and therein lies the distinction between 'nuisance' and 'negligence."'
Reasonableness, in particular, formed a significant limit on the law of
nuisance. Instead, in early cases reasonableness is more a question of what rights
a party has to use his own property before he is impinging on the property of his
neighbor. Reasonableness formed an overall limit on the concept of a land use
being a nuisance. 2 0 1 Doctrine required that a court determine "whether or not the
use of the property in the manner complained of is reasonable and in accordance
with the relative rights of the parties."202
As a result of the inclusion of reasonableness in the primafacie case of
nuisance, courts did not follow precisely the idea of strict liability. Instead,
liability was based on the appropriateness of a land use for the cultural context.
This significantly softened the doctrine from an idea of strict liability.
Additionally, as I have argued elsewhere, from the mid-twentieth century on,
courts introduced the concept of a balancing of rights into the doctrine of
nuisance law, thereby making another important change that reduced the
likelihood of nuisance liability and, thereby, reduced the scope of property
rights. 2 03

2. More Ways Courts Have Softened Strict Liability: The
Implications of Balancing in Nuisance Actions
In previous work, I detailed the history of the concept of balancing
within nuisance actions.2 " In particular, I argued that the concept of balancing
has sneakily made its way from the remedies portion of the deliberations into the
core elements of the cause of action.2 05 While I have criticized this change20 6
and noted its unfortunate implications for private property rights 20 7-I have also
acknowledged that a number of modern courts follow this approach and includes
a balancing of social utility against the gravity of harm within the core elements
of nuisance.208
If a court includes balancing within the elements of nuisance, then the
court is already acknowledging the many limitations on nuisance liability-

200
201
202
203

Harris v. Findlay, 18 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938).
Glucose Refining Co. v. Chicago, 138 F. 209, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1905).
Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162, 167 (1884).
Fraley, supra note 9, at 653-54.
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Id.
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Id. at 654.
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Id.
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Id at 678-79.
Id. at 676.
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including the costs to others in the community who are not parties to the action.
Specifically, rather than focusing solely on conduct within the elements of
establishing the nuisance action, the court is already using its discretion to think
about cultural issues that may make the alleged nuisance more or less tolerable,
including the many advantages of land uses that may be problematic for their
immediate neighbors but beneficial for the population more generally. All of this
means that nuisance law is not looking particularly like strict liability in these
circumstances. As Henry Smith noted, "[u]nder the balancing approach, nuisance
starts looking like core areas of tort law, particularly the law of negligence."20 9
Notably, the balancing inquiries of this type underscore the earlier point
that nuisance is quintessentially about property rights. The circumstance-specific
inquiries that courts make are about property and land use rather than about
conduct and its wrongfulness.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Second Restatement argued that what distinguishes nuisance from
negligence is only the type of interest invaded (land rather than person) rather
than some difference in terms of the unwanted conduct. It is the property context
that distinguishes nuisance from other tort concepts. This does not mean,
however, that courts should adopt tort principles for the law of nuisance. Indeed,
it indicates quite the opposite: that nuisance law is differently situated from other
areas of tort law. Nuisance law functions to protect rights in private propertyanother area of law that rarely follows tort approaches.
The Second Restatement sticks to this rule, not revising it, even while,
after nearly forty years, only a minority of jurisdictions have adopted the
Restatement approach. The majority of jurisdictions decline to accept the rule
and, indeed, are careful to distinguish nuisance from negligence or other tort
claims.
There are excellent reasons why the Second Restatement approach
remains a minority view. In particular, nuisance law protects the right to exclude,
a quintessential if not defining feature of private property. Traditional nuisance
law-and the law followed by the majority of jurisdictions-provides more
robust protections when compared with negligence specifically because of the
necessity of protecting the right to exclude and, thereby, the integrity of property
rights. In short, the Second Restatement got it wrong, and those states following
the Second Restatement position should reconsider.
The primary argument that the Second Restatement made in favor of its
position was that the remainder of tort law had moved away from strict liability
approaches, and that to be consistent, nuisance law should do the same. There is
little to support this argument. If nuisance law quintessentially protects property
rights and the right to exclude, then there is no particular reason that nuisance

209

Smith, supranote 187, at 967.
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should be doctrinally aligned with other types of tort law. Indeed, the uniqueness
of those circumstances argue against such an alignment, suggesting instead that
nuisance would logically deviate so as to adapt itself to our expectations for
property rights. Additionally, the Second Restatement's argument makes
unwarranted presumptions about the strictness of nuisance doctrine. In fact,
traditional nuisance doctrine was far less than strict liability; it contained
elements that already contextualized the inquiry, allowed for discretion, and

softened liability. Finally, the overall trend of modem nuisance law has been to
introduce even more contextualization, softening and discretion through the
advent of balancing tests within the primafacie case. In sum, there is little to
support the Second Restatement's approach and a great deal to be lost-in terms
of property rights and particularly the right to exclude-in adopting the Second
Restatement's position.
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